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Abstract— Routing security challenges significantly impact the 
wide-scale adoption of mobile ad hoc networks (MANET), with 
wormholes constituting an especially severe threat. Wormhole 
detection algorithms like traversal time and hop count analysis 
(TTHCA) and modified transmission time-based mechanism (M-
TTM) combine effective detection with low traffic overheads. 
TTHCA measures packet traversal time (PTT) per route hop count 
(HC), while M-TTM compares an expected round trip time (RTT) 
with a measured RTT. However, using only fixed thresholds for the 
permissible PTT/HC and measured RTT deviations respectively, 
both algorithms are compromised so participation mode (PM), out-
of-band (O-B) wormholes are inadequately detected in MANETs 
with large radio range fluctuations. This paper presents an 
extended variant of the TTHCA algorithm called traversal time per 
hop analysis (TTpHA) that dynamically adapts the PTT per hop 
threshold to both different node radio coverages and prevailing 
MANET conditions. Experimental results confirm TTpHA 
provides superior PM O-B detection performance compared to 
TTHCA and M-TTM, with commensurately low false positive 
rates and traffic overheads. 
 Keywords—Mobile networks; MANET; MANET security; 
routing security; hop count; packet traversal time; variable radio 
range; TTHCA. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a self-configuring 
arrangement of wireless nodes where multi-hop communication 
is feasible without requiring core infrastructure like routers and 
base stations. Potential MANET applications include military 
communications, vehicular and sensor networks, as well as 
Internet access mechanisms in scenarios where nodes are out-of-
radio range. 
Their open nature and the absence of dedicated routers mean 
that MANETs are especially vulnerable to routing attacks [1][2]. 
The wormhole attack [3] is one of the most severe MANET 
routing threats since it is relatively easy to launch, difficult to 
detect, and yet can cause significant communications disruption. 
Two collaborating malicious nodes create a fictive shortcut link 
in the network by forwarding routing packets to each other with 
the intention to attract more data packets to traverse the 
wormhole link. Once the wormhole has been successfully 
established, the malicious nodes can disrupt network operation 
by either dropping packets or launching more pernicious attacks, 
such as eavesdropping and packet sniffing. 
A wormhole attack can be launched in either hidden mode 
(HM) or participation mode (PM) [4]. In the former, malicious 
nodes capture and forward routing packets to each other without 
modifying the actual packets, so the wormhole nodes never 
appear in routing tables. In contrast, PM nodes process routing 
packets as any pair of legitimate nodes and therefore appear in a 
wormhole infected route as two contiguous nodes. 
The malicious nodes can forward routing packets to each 
other using either an in-band (I-B) or out-of-band (O-B) 
wormhole link. An I-B link tunnels packets between the 
malicious nodes via genuine network nodes, while an O-B link 
is more complex because it requires an external communication 
channel, i.e. network cable or directional antenna, to establish a 
direct link between the wormhole nodes. 
Designing effective robust wormhole detection schemes 
means considering all four modes with each mandating different 
requirements upon the detection mechanism. While various 
detection strategies have been proposed in [3][5-13], most 
solutions have some recurring limitations including the inability 
to detect all wormhole types, the requirement for dedicated 
hardware, reliance on particular MANET environments, and 
imposing high computational overheads and/or bandwidth loads 
upon the network.  
Several wormhole attack detection schemes are based on 
analysing round trip time (RTT) per hop, including delay per 
hop indication (DelPHI) [6], wormhole attack prevention 
(WAP) [7], and transmission time based mechanism (TTM) [8]. 
A route with an unrealistically high RTT per hop count (HC) or 
between any two successive hops is suspected to be wormhole 
infected. RTT-based approaches offer low overhead solutions in 
terms of hardware, computation, and throughput, but have the 
limitation that variations in a node’s packet processing time must 
be small. In a real MANET, nodes can exhibit high packet 
processing time variations resulting in low wormhole detection 
rates and high false positive (FP) rates for RTT-based solutions, 
as is theoretically proven in [9] and in [10]. 
Alternative approaches like wormhole attack detection using 
hop latency and adjoining (WAD-HLA) node analysis [11] and 
neighbor probe acknowledge (NPA) [12] improve the detection 
performance of RTT-based methods by measuring the RTT 
between two nodes multiple times and using statistics to 
determine the RTT value. This correlates better with the route 
distance between two hops, though such strategies tend to lead 
to increased network traffic loads.   
Another approach [9, 10, 13] for improving the distance 
estimation accuracy between nodes is to subtract the packet 
processing times from RTT measurements, resulting in the air 
packet traversal time (PTT). The PTT of a route reflects better 
than RTT the route distance between two nodes. In [9], a 
modified version of TTM (M-TTM) was proposed where every 
node on a route measures the RTT between itself and the next 
hop. The measured RTT is then compared with the expected 
RTT, which is estimated by measuring the packet processing 
times of the route request (RREQ) and route reply (RREP) 
packets at the next hop and thereafter adding the maximum PTT 
(PTTMAX). If the measured RTT between two nodes is 
significantly higher than the expected RTT, then a wormhole is 
suspected.  
While M-TTM provides good detection performance under 
certain conditions, it has a number of limitations. Firstly, each 
node along a route must add four different timestamps to every 
routing packet to reflect the specific times incurred in receiving 
and forwarding RREQ and RREP packets. The assumptions 
underpinning how the expected RTT is determined are also 
unrealistic since in [9] PTTMAX is presumed to be 1µs which 
corresponds to a distance of about 300m. In a real network, the 
PTTMAX of a node will be dependent on both its hardware and 
surroundings, since in a line-of-sight (LOS) link PTTMAX will be 
much higher than when there are obstacles between nodes. 
Furthermore, applying a set 2ms threshold for the maximum 
difference between the measured and expected RTT values 
means that it cannot detect all wormhole types. For instance, if 
the MANET has a PM O-B wormhole, then the PTT between 
the malicious nodes is short and is the only extra delay incurred.  
Traversal time and hop count analysis (TTHCA) [10] is a 
recent wormhole detection technique designed as a security 
extension to the ad hoc on demand distance vector (AODV) [14]  
routing protocol and is lightweight in terms of both network 
overheads and computational complexity. It combines the 
benefits of RTT-based approaches and HC analysis [15] to 
provide improved detection for all wormhole types under a 
multiplicity of network scenarios. TTHCA applies a fixed 
threshold R/S, where R is the maximum radio range per node and 
S is signal propagation speed (i.e. 3 ∙ 108 m/s), for the maximum 
permissible PTT/HC. In a homogeneous MANET where all 
nodes are in LOS, TTHCA is able to detect PM O-B wormholes. 
However, in real MANETs nodes usually have different 
hardware and encounter obstacles like walls and buildings. This 
causes fluctuations in the radio coverage of nodes. For both PM 
I-B and HM O-B/I-B wormholes, radio coverage variations do 
not affect wormhole detection performance of TTHCA, because 
such wormhole links incur long delays. However, for a fast-link 
PM O-B wormhole TTHCA detection rate is dependent on both 
radio coverage variation and wormhole length. See [10] for a 
critical evaluation of TTHCA. 
The main limitation of TTHCA is its use of a rigid threshold 
in the PTT/HC analysis, so to relax this constraint, this paper 
introduces an extended flexible detection technique called 
traversal time per hop analysis (TTpHA). This uses TTHCA as 
its kernel and by using a dynamic threshold for the maximum 
permissible PTT value for each hop, TTpHA can readily adapt 
to prevailing network conditions and can handle variable node 
radio ranges and different environments, while affording 
superior detection accuracy. 
A key factor in detecting PM O-B wormholes with PTT-
based detection techniques, including TTpHA, TTHCA and M-
TTM, is the accuracy of the timestamps generated for incoming 
and outgoing routing packets. For I-B and/or HM wormholes 
this is though not an issue due to their long link delays.  This 
paper includes an analysis of the requirements on the timestamp 
resolution (TR) for TTpHA and provides comparative 
simulation results between TTpHA and M-TTM for PM O-B 
wormhole attack detection performance for different TR values 
and network conditions. The impact of node mobility during the 
route discovery procedure on TTpHA and M-TTM wormhole 
attack detection performance is also evaluated.  
 As it in [10] was shown that I-B and HM wormholes can be 
successfully detected by both TTHCA and TTpHA (since it is 
an extension of TTHCA) and since TR and radio covarage 
variabilities are not critical for such wormholes, the focus of this 
paper turns to the challenging PM O-B wormhole detection. The 
remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The TTpHA 
algorithm is introduced in Section II. Simulation experiments 
and a comparative results analysis of TTpHA with the original 
TTHCA algorithm and M-TTM is then presented in Section III, 
with some concluding comments being given in Section IV.  
II. THE PACKET TRAVERSAL TIME PER HOP 
ANALYSIS ALGORITHM      
TTpHA is a significant extension to the TTHCA algorithm 
[10], embracing two new features. TTpHA measures and 
analyses PTT for each successive hop (PTTi,i+1) rather than 
PTT/HC to provide more accurate wormhole attack detection, 
and uses a dynamic threshold for the maximum permissible 
PTTi,i+1 to automatically adapt to variable radio ranges and 
network environments. In this section, the TTpHA route 
discovery procedure to obtain PTTi,i+1 calculations is presented 
before describing and critically analyzing the dynamic threshold 
mechanism. 
A. TTpHA Extended AODV Route Discovery Procedure 
TTpHA extends the AODV route discovery procedure 
analogously to TTHCA [10] with routing packet processing time 
(∆Ti) measurements at all destination and intermediate nodes 
where ∆Ti is the sum of the AODV RREQ and RREP packet 
(RREQAODV and RREPAODV) processing times at node i 
(∆Ti={∆TRREQ}i+{∆TRREP}i). To render PTTi,i+1 calculations, 
TTpHA measures PTT between each intermediate and the 
destination node (PTTi) in a similar way as route PTT 
measurements are performed in TTHCA. Each PTTi is delivered 
to the source node as a separate parameter of a new RREP packet 
(RREPTTpHA) together with the sum of all ∆Ti values (∆TTOT).  To 
achieve high resolution timestamps, the ∆Ti measurements must 
be performed at the physical layer while routing packets are 
processed at the network layer. For this reason, the ∆TTOT 
parameter and the PTTi values cannot be simply added to 
RREPAODV as is proposed in [10]. The complete TTpHA 
extended AODV route discovery procedure is illustrated in Fig. 
1, where node 1, 2 and 3 are the source, intermediate, and 
destination nodes respectively, {TRREQr}i and {TRREQs}i are the 
timestamps generated when receiving and sending the first bit of 
RREQAODV at node i, while {TRREPr}i and {TRREPs}i are the 
corresponding RREPAODV timestamps. 
 
Fig. 1. The TTpHA extended AODV route discovery procedure. 
Upon receiving RREPAODV and RREPTTpHA at the end of a 
route discovery procedure, the source node calculates each 
PTTi,i+1 from  
𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖,𝑖+1 = 𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖  
if node i+1 is the destination node, otherwise 
𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖,𝑖+1 = 𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖  − 𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖+1 
Each PTTi,i+1 is then inserted as an element of a vector V which 
is ranked in ascending order. V is used to determine a dynamic 
threshold Θ for the maximum permissible PTTi,i+1 of the route. 
If nodes i and i+1 form a PM wormhole, then PTTi,i+1 at node i 
will be larger than any healthy PTTi,i+1. Thus, the wormhole link 
is detected if VHC > Θ. The complete TTpHA algorithm at the 
source node is shown in Fig. 2, where it is assumed there is only 
one wormhole link per route. To detect multiple wormhole links, 
all elements of V (1 ≤ n ≤ HC) must be separately evaluated.  
B. Dynamic Threshold Θ 
To successfully identify the PTTi,i+1 of a wormhole link it 
must be compared with a threshold value that is considered to be 
the upper bound for healthy PTTi,i+1 values. Automatic adaption 
to variable network environments and diverse node hardware 
requires dynamic calculation of Θ. To achieve this, an outlier 
detection technique, such as Grubb’s test [16], the box plot 
method [17], or Dixon’s Q-test [18] is usable to identify the 
wormhole link PTTi,i+1, which is typically significantly higher 
than any healthy PTTi,i+1. To determine Θ, the Q-test was chosen 
because it is specifically designed for small sample numbers n, 
typically 3 ≤ n ≤ 10, while in analyzing all PTTi,i+1 values of a 
route n = HC. Considering larger sample numbers [19], it is a 
pragmatic design assumption that n≤30, since at higher values 
communicating nodes will be located unrealistically long 
distances apart and a route will incur high delays. The threshold 
Θ is calculated from the ranked V values as 
𝜃 =
𝑉𝑛−1 −   𝑄𝐶𝑉1
1 −  𝑄𝐶
 (3) 
where Vn-1 is the second largest PTTi,i+1 value, V1 is the smallest 
value, and QC is the critical Q value for a chosen confidence level 
α defined in [20].  
 
Fig. 2. Flowchart of the TTpHA algorithm at the source node (node 1). 
If the route HC < 3, then (3) cannot be used. However, since the 
minimum HC of a PM wormhole infected route is 3, it is 
reasonable to apply the TTHCA [10] fixed threshold by defining 
Θ =  
𝑅
𝑆
. A wormhole is then suspected if 
𝑉𝑛  >  𝛩 (4) 
where Vn  is the largest PTTi,i+1 value.  
The choice of parameter α affords a useful design trade-off 
mechanism between wormhole detection and FP rates. A high α 
means low FP rates, but a concomitantly lower wormhole 
detection probability. Conversely, a low α increases the 
probability of detecting a wormhole, but with a higher FP rate. 
A confidence level α=0.9 was empirically determined for all the 
ensuing simulations as it represents the best design choice from 
a detection perspective.   
A critical analysis of how key TTpHA factors including 
radio range variability, TR, node mobility, and time 
measurement tampering influence the wormhole detection 
capability of Θ will now be presented. 
1) Radio Range Variability 
 If the route HC ≥ 3, then (3) is applied to calculate Θ. As Θ 
is automatically determined from PTTi,i+1 values in V, the 
TTpHA wormhole detection performance is dependent not only 
on the PTTi,i+1 of the wormhole link but also on the variability of 
RREPAODV
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Vi…n-1. The maximum permissible variability of Vi…n-1 which can 
still guarantee 100% detection of PM O-B wormholes is defined 
in Lemma 1. 
Lemma 1: If Vn = PTTi,i+1 of a wormhole link, then it will always 
be detected provided all Vi…n-1 are within the bounds:  
𝑥𝑟𝑤ℎ
𝑆
≤ 𝑉𝑖  ≤  
𝑅
𝑆
 (5) 
where x defines the smallest permissible distance between two 
successive nodes (ri,i+1) in relation to the length of the 
wormhole link  (rwh). The x value is calculated from: 
𝑥 =
𝑟𝑤ℎ(1 − 𝑄𝐶) − 𝑅
𝑅(−𝑄𝐶)
 (6) 
for the worst case scenario Vn-1= 
𝑅
𝑆
, i.e. largest ri,i+1=R.  
Proof: If Vn-1 = 
𝑅
𝑆
 and V1 ≥  
𝑥𝑟𝑤ℎ
𝑆
 then from (3) Θ ≤  
𝑟𝑤ℎ
𝑆
 and 
thus the wormhole is detected. Correspondingly, if V1 < 
𝑥𝑟𝑤ℎ
𝑆
 
then Θ > 
𝑟𝑤ℎ
𝑆
 and the wormhole will not be detected.               ■ 
In a homogeneous LOS MANET environment ri,i+1 can lie 
within the range [0, R]. This means that there is a risk that a PM 
O-B wormhole goes undetected if both the wormhole link and 
the route are short. The average ri,i+1 is though in such 
environments in practice close to R while in non-LOS 
environments physical obstacles and differences in antenna 
capabilities lead to a higher variability in ri,i+1 since the 
momentary radio range (Ri) at many nodes is less than R. If the 
maximum radio coverage of a specific node in a non-LOS 
environment is Ri, then ri,i+1 is bounded by 
𝑟𝑖,𝑖+1 + 𝑟𝑖+1,𝑖+2 > min {𝑅𝑖 , 𝑅𝑖+1} (7) 
(7) cannot be false, since then the 2-hop neighbor of node i 
would still lie within radio range and become a direct 1-hop 
neighbor. The condition in (7) means, that a short route infected 
by a short PM O-B wormhole will have a greater likelihood of 
going undetected than in a homogenous LOS environment. 
2) Timestamp Resolution (TR) 
To calculate ∆Ti in TTpHA, each intermediate node creates 
four timestamps ({TRREQr}i, {TRREQs}i, {TRREPr}i, and {TRREPs}i) 
and the destination node two ({TRREQr}i and {TRREPs}i). The 
source node creates two timestamps to calculate route RTT 
({TRREQs}i and {TRREPr}i). TR causes for each created timestamp a 
measurement error ETR, 0≤ ETR<TR. The value of each generated 
timestamp can therefore be expressed as TA+ETR where TA is the 
actual time. 
 Each PTTi,i+1 is calculated as 
𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖,𝑖+1 =
{𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑟 − 𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑄𝑠}𝑖 − {𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑠 − 𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑄𝑟}𝑖+1
2
 
PTTi,i+1 is minimized for  
 lim(ETR)=TR when generating {TRREQs}i and {TRREPs}i+1 
 ETR=0 when generating the other timestamps 
and maximized for  
 lim(ETR)=TR when generating {TRREPs}i and {TRREQr}i+1 
 ETR =0 when generating the other timestamps.  
So each calculated PTTi,i+1 value lies between: 
𝑟𝑖
𝑆
− (𝑙𝑖𝑚(𝐸𝑇𝑅) = 𝑇𝑅) ≤ 𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖,𝑖+1 ≤
𝑟𝑖
𝑆
+ (𝑙𝑖𝑚(𝐸𝑇𝑅) = 𝑇𝑅) 
Using (8) and (9), it can be concluded that a PM O-B 
wormhole will always be detected provided the following 
condition is upheld: 
𝑟𝑤ℎ
𝑆
− 𝑙𝑖𝑚(𝐸𝑇𝑅)
>
(
max (𝑟𝑖)
𝑆 + 𝑙𝑖𝑚
(𝐸𝑇𝑅)) −  𝑄𝐶 (
min (𝑟𝑖)
𝑆  − 𝑙𝑖𝑚
(𝐸𝑇𝑅))
1 − 𝑄𝐶


which for 𝑙𝑖𝑚(𝐸𝑇𝑅) = 𝑇𝑅 is equivalent to 
𝑇𝑅 <
𝑄𝐶(𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑟𝑖) − 𝑟𝑤ℎ) + 𝑟𝑤ℎ − 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟𝑖)
2𝑆
 (11) 
3) Mobility 
Node mobility during the route discovery procedure will 
impact on a measured PTTi,i+1 value in the sense, that it will not 
correspond exactly to the ri,i+1 value when node i sends a RREQ 
or receives the RREP, unless nodes i and i+1 are moving in the 
same direction with exactly the same speed. PTTi,i+1 will still 
represent a valid ri,i+1 within the bound specified by (7), because 
even though two successive nodes on a route are moving they 
cannot communicate if ri,i+1>Ri. For this reason wormhole 
attack detection performance will not be affected.  
4) Time Measurement Tampering 
Wormhole nodes can potentially tamper with PTTi and ∆Ti 
values in order to prevent the PTTi,i+1 of a wormhole link from 
being > θ. A successful time measurement tampering attack is 
though challenging to realize in practice since the malicious 
nodes must be aware of the exact delay of the wormhole link, 
otherwise the attack may easily result in either PTTi,i+1 < 0 or a 
PTTi,i+1 still being > θ. The  prevailing conditions for a time 
measurement tampering attack on TTHCA to succeed  has been 
formally analyzed and an extension for time measurement 
tampering detection for PM I-B wormholes has been proposed 
in [21]. While this extension can be applied in TTpHA, time 
measurement tampering attacks for PM O-B wormholes can be 
detected for instance by permitting third party neighboring 
nodes to collaborate promiscuously to validate time  
measurements. A future research proposal is thus to investigate 
a distributed time measurement tampering detection strategy. 
III. SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS 
The wormhole and FP detection performance for different 
wormhole lengths, Ri variations, and TR values was analyzed in 
a series of simulation experiments. The MANET simulation 
environments in these experiments were created in ns-2 [22] for 
packet propagation speed S=3∙108 m/s and the TwoRayGround 
[23] propagation model. All network nodes except the wormhole 
nodes were assigned new random positions for each simulation 
run. For wormhole detection evaluation two wormhole nodes 
were strategically placed in the center of the simulation 
environment, a specific distance rwh from each other, to disrupt 
as much network traffic as possible from all network nodes. The 
shortest wormhole length tested was rwh = 3R, i.e. 3 hops, since 
in the simulation environment the amount of network traffic 
attracted in shorter wormholes is minimal. The wormhole link 
delay for an O-B link was defined as S/rwh, which corresponds 
to the use of a directional antenna. During the FP detection 
evaluations the simulation environment was wormhole free. 
TTHCA [10] and M-TTM [9] were used as comparators since 
TTpHA is based on TTHCA and uses a similar packet delay per 
hop analysis scheme to that employed in M-TTM. The 2ms fixed 
threshold for the maximum permissible difference between the 
measured and expected RTT values defined in [9] was omitted 
due to its impropriety for PM O-B wormhole detection. Hence, 
a wormhole is detected if any measured RTT > expected RTT.   
In the experiments, two MANET scenarios are considered, 
i.e. an indoor and an outdoor environment, for which the 
respective parameter settings are shown in Table 1. In both 
environments it is assumed that all network nodes use IEEE 
802.11n compliant wireless hardware, which determines the 
approximate R values in Table 1. The outdoor environment size 
and number of nodes N are defined as in [15] while the indoor 
environment dimensions reflect a large building. In a real 
MANET, the momentary radio range Ri will also be dependent 
on the antenna used and node surroundings, e.g. in an indoor 
environment containing obstructions like walls Ri is smaller than 
in a LOS environment. A random Ri distance value in the range 
min(Ri)≤ Ri≤ R is introduced. The results from these simulation 
experiments are presented in the following subsections. 
TABLE I.  SPECIFIC PARAMETERS USED FOR INDOOR AND OUTDOOR 
SIMULATION ENVIRONMENTS 
Parameter Outdoor settings Indoor settings 
Number of nodes (N) 300 300 
Network width (W) 1000m 100m 
Network length (L) 4000m 400m 
Maximal radio range / node (R) 250m 70m 
Number of infected (NIR) and 
healthy (NHR) route samples 
200 200 
A. Variable Radio Range 
In the first set of experiments, the comparative wormhole 
detection performance of TTpHA, TTHCA, and M-TTM was 
evaluated for different Ri variability levels and wormhole 
lengths. The results, shown in Fig. 3, reveal that for TTpHA, 
radio range variability does not significantly impact on the 
wormhole detection performance since > 90% of the wormhole 
infected routes were detected outdoors and > 80% indoors for all 
tested Ri variations. This contrasts to TTHCA, where the 
combination of a short wormhole and high radio range 
variability substantially decreased the detection rate.  
In the outdoor environment, TTpHA wormhole detection 
rate tended to slightly drop with increased Ri variability. For 
example, the detection rate of the 3-hop wormhole was 
approximately 95% for min(Ri)=R and 90% for min(Ri)=0.2R. 
The opposite trend was observed for the indoor environment, 
with 82% detection rate for the 3-hop wormhole case when 
min(Ri)=R and 100% when min(Ri)=0.2R. The reason is that the 
route HC indoors was often <5 when min(Ri)=R which 
according to Lemma 1 means there is a risk that the condition in 
(5) is not upheld.  The (5) condition has a significantly higher 
probability of being upheld when min(Ri)=0.2R, for which the 
average route HC is significantly higher. Outdoors the average 
route HC was higher than indoors and therefore (5) was mostly 
upheld even for min(Ri)=R. 
Wormhole detection performance of TTHCA fails 
dramatically for min(Ri)<R because it is based on the average 
PTT/HC. For Ri < R the average ri,i+1 is low compared to R and 
the condition PTT/HC > R/S [10] is not upheld.  M-TTM, on the 
other hand, provided 100% detection of all wormholes outdoors 
and of all 5-hop wormholes indoors. However, no wormholes 
shorter than 5 hops were detected indoors. The reason is that M-
TTM assumes PTTMAX=1µs for the expected RTTi,i+1 and a 
wormhole is suspected if a measured RTTi,i+1>expected RTTi,i+1. 
A wormhole link is therefore only detected if rwh  >
1µ𝑠
𝑆
. A cursory 
review of the results reveals that TTpHA is much more flexible, 
since it automatically adjusts its threshold to the prevailing 
environment, while M-TTM and TTHCA are only appropriate 
to outdoor environments.  
 
Fig. 3. Comparative TTpHA and M-TTM wormhole detection and FP 
performance for different wormhole lengths and radio range variations. 
In terms of the corresponding FP rates, it was observed that 
the Ri variability level impacts on the performance of TTpHA 
since outdoors, the FP rate was just 4% when R≤ Ri≤ R, but 10% 
when 0.2R≤ Ri≤ R. The corresponding FP rates indoors were 
marginally lower, at 2% and 8% respectively. These results can 
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be reduced by choosing a higher confidence value α for the 
threshold. However, this will decrease wormhole detection rates. 
From a wormhole detection perspective, a FP rate of up to 10% 
is still a laudable outcome considering the significant detection 
improvement achieved by TTpHA compared to both TTHCA 
and M-TTM. Furthermore, a higher FP rate does not prevent 
communication with a destination node, but the shortest route 
might be disabled. 
It needs to be stressed that the fixed threshold used in 
TTHCA and PTTMAX in M-TTM could be manually adjusted to 
the indoor environment to provide similar detection 
performance to that achieved for the outdoor environment. 
However, since this would involve decreasing these values, 
there would be a significantly higher FP detection rate outdoors. 
This highlights a key advantage of TTpHA in its ability to 
automatically adjust to its environment and move seamlessly 
between different situations without the need for any manual 
parameter adjustment.      
These results are based on the assumption that each 
timestamp used in all three detection techniques can be 
generated with a 1ns measurement accuracy. This is not a wholly 
realistic assumption for all constituent MANET hardware even 
if TR values as good as 1 ns can be achieved with currently 
available timestamping hardware [24][25]. Therefore, the next 
section presents a performance insight into relaxing this 
assumption. 
B. Time Measurement Accuracy  
The next series of experiments analyzed the requirements 
imposed upon wireless interface hardware regarding the 
tolerances to TR required to monitor and process in-coming and 
out-going routing packets. Again different wormhole lengths 
were used and the performance of TTpHA and M-TTM was 
tested across a TR range from 1ns to 1µs. For example, TR=10ns 
means that every node is capable of both detecting and 
timestamping reception or transmission of a routing packet 
every 10ns. In these experiments, a radio range variability of 
0.2R≤ Ri≤ R was used to reflect a realistic mixture of node 
hardware and obstacles. Due its overall poor wormhole 
detection performance in highly variable radio range scenarios, 
TTHCA was not included as a comparator in this particular 
results analysis.  
The results in Fig. 4 show that the TTpHA wormhole 
detection performance is not significantly decreased even when 
TR at each node is only 100ns, as more than 90% of all tested 
wormholes were detected. The reason for this is obvious in the 
outdoor scenario, because the maximum allowable TR value in 
(11) >100ns when the route HC ≥ 5 and rwh=750m and the 
majority of the obtained wormhole infected routes had more 
than 5 hops. The corresponding maximum tolerable TR for the 
indoor environment does not exceed 100ns before the route 
HC≥9. However, each PTTi,i+1 value can vary within the bounds 
in (9), and since these can only be compromised in exceptional 
circumstances, wormhole detection performance is not 
significantly lowered despite a large proportion of infected 
routes being shorter than 9 hops. Even for TR=1µs, TTpHA still 
provides good performance in the outdoor environment scenario 
with a detection rate of 90% for all wormholes. For the indoor 
environment, the wormhole detection rate becomes heavily 
degraded when TR=1µs with a detection rate of only 30…50%. 
The reason is that TR is in fact larger than any 
𝑟𝑖,𝑖+1
𝑆
 and 
𝑟𝑤ℎ
𝑆
. It is 
thus in practice impossible to discern a healthy link from a 
wormhole infected link, as is also indicated by the corresponding 
FP rate (~32%) being akin to the detection rate.  
When the TR=1µs, M-TTM interestingly detected nearly 
30% of the 3-hop wormholes and up to 50% of the 4-hop 
wormholes in the indoor environment even though for both 
wormhole lengths 
𝑟𝑤ℎ
𝑆
<PTTMAX. The reason for this is that 
(PTTMAX - 
𝑟𝑤ℎ
𝑆
)<TR and as a result ETR often causes a measured 
wormhole link PTTi,i+1 to be >PTTMAX.. While these are still poor 
results, the detection rate of the 5 HC wormhole was satisfactory 
as more than 70% of the wormholes were detected compared to 
50% for TTpHA. However, when cognizance is taken of the 
overall wormhole detection performance, TTpHA is noticeably 
superior, since it detects all wormholes types with greater 
flexibility than M-TTM at a consistently high rate both indoors 
and outdoors even when TR=100ns, while M-TTM was unable 
to detect indoor 3-hop and 4-hop wormholes at all.  
 
Fig. 4. Comparative TTpHA and M-TTM wormhole detection performance 
and FP detections for different wormhole lengths and TR values. 
While the FP rate tends to increase for TTpHA with 
increasing TR values, the rate never exceeds 13% when 
TR≤100ns in either of the tested environments. This is a 
satisfactory outcome since there still exists an 87% probability 
of finding the shortest route between the source and destination 
nodes. When TR=1µs the FP rates for the outdoor and the indoor 
environments are 37% and 32% respectively, which although 
high is still acceptable since on average < 2 healthy routes need 
to be requested and checked to find a useful route. Hence, this 
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confirms that TTpHA functions outdoors with existing off-the-
shelf IEEE 802.11n compliant wireless hardware. The 
wormhole detection rate of M-TTM was indoors, as for TTpHA, 
unchanged for all tested TR values. However, for TR=1µs, M-
TTM generated a FP rate of 62% which is high since this means 
in less than 40% of cases, the shortest route is available for 
communication. The high FP rate for M-TTM outdoors is caused 
by 
𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑀𝐴𝑋 – 𝑅
𝑆
=166ns which is <<TR=1µs, so it is very likely 
that a healthy measured RTTi,i+1>expected RTTi,i+1.  
C. Computational and Network Traffic Overheads 
The only additional processing costs incurred by TTpHA in 
comparison with TTHCA and M-TTM, are at the source node 
related to the Q-test outlier technique used to calculate Θ in (3). 
This involves determining and ranking PTTi,i+1 values with 
complexities O(HC) and O(HC2) respectively. The additional 
overhead is negligible since HC is a very small value. At each 
intermediate node, PTTi has to be computed and inserted to a 
new RREP packet parameter which is not required in TTHCA. 
This involves one operation and a 32∙HCi bits larger RREP than 
in TTHCA, where HCi refers to the HC from the intermediate 
node i to the destination. While all these operations except 
ranking are also required in M-TTM, the PTTi values are 
calculated at the source and the corresponding RREP packets are 
3∙32∙HCi bits longer than those in TTpHA. To summarize, as 
well as being a more flexible wormhole detection solution, 
TTpHA consistently offers significantly superior wormhole 
detection performance in comparison with TTHCA and M-
TTM, with minimal additional computation and network traffic 
costs being incurred.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
This paper has presented a packet traversal time per hop 
analysis (TTpHA) wormhole attack detection algorithm based 
on traversal time and hop count analysis (TTHCA) offering 
superior wormhole detection accuracy by analyzing packet 
traversal time (PTT) for each hop rather than PTT per hop count. 
TTpHA is significantly more flexible than related PTT-based 
solutions, including TTHCA and M-TTM, since it employs a 
dynamic threshold for the maximum permissible PTT between 
two legitimate nodes for adaption to prevailing MANET 
conditions and variable radio ranges. Critical simulation results 
evaluations showed that TTpHA provided accurate wormhole 
detection performance in both indoor and outdoor environments 
while the comparators, TTHCA and M-TTM, were only 
applicable in the outdoor environment without manual 
adjustments of their fixed thresholds. The results also indicated 
that in outdoor environments with long radio ranges, TTpHA 
can be implemented using low timestamp resolution off-the-
shelf wireless hardware, while providing consistently high 
wormhole detection rates. Concomitantly, the costs in terms of 
false positive rates and the corresponding computational and 
network overheads remain pragmatically low.   
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